






























































European Commission adopts  communications and guidelines.  In  these  communications and guide‐








These  communications  and  guidelines  are no  legally binding  acts  according  to Article 288  TFEU.  In 
combination with  the Primary  law principles of equal  treatment and of  the protection of  legitimate 
expectations,  however,  the  Commission  is  self‐bound  by  these  guidelines  and  communications.  In 
adopting  rules of  conduct  and  announcing by publishing  them  that  they will  apply  to  the  cases  to 
which they relate, the Commission  imposes a  limit on the exercise of  its discretion under Article 107 










2 This package was originally a reaction of  the European Commission on  the  judgment of  the ECJ, Case C‐280/00, Altmark 






the operation of services of general economic  interest  ([2012] OJ L 7/3),  (4) Commission Regulation on  the application of 











































































be seen  in Annex 2,  in  reality,  the different corporate  tax  rates  in  the EU Member States are not a 
problem. Exemptions and case‐by‐case reductions of the effective tax rate for single undertakings are 
at the core of the problem of harmful tax competition. 







EC State aids, p. 241, 256 at point 10‐016).  It  is necessary  to  identify a benchmark not  just  in  relation  to  the question of 
whether an advantage  is unilateral or selective but also  in connection with  the conferment of advantage. However, many 
legal authors identify the benchmark within the selectivity. If teams are doing so as well, this cannot be seen as a mistake. 














all  economic operators  in  a Member  State.  It  can  also  be  a  subgroup of  economic operators.  This 
means that a tax measure may appear at first sight to be a selective advantage for certain undertak‐
ings if these undertakings are to be compared to entirety of economic operators. If, however, the ob‐




































the ability  to pay and  the  functioning and effectiveness of  the general  tax system. Besides, both re‐
ferred to “mechanisms  inherent  in the tax system  itself which are necessary  for the achievement of 
[objectives attributed  to a particular  tax scheme].”19 Up  to  today, mainly cases originating  from  the 
last group successfully met the justification test.20  
bb) Justification by legitimate objectives without a link to the general tax system 
In the case  law the question was raised whether there  is a further possibility to  justify tax rules that 
deviate from the general tax system by referring to  legitimate objectives that are pursued by the tax 
measure in question. The General Court justified in the case of British Aggregates21 a British levy22 and 
in  the  so‐called NOx  case23  the Dutch  emission  trading  system24  by  environmental  objectives.  The 
General Court stated that “Member States are free, in balancing the various interests involved, to set 
their  priorities  as  regards  the  protection  of  the  environment  and,  as  a  result,  to  determine which 
goods or services they are to decide to subject to an environmental levy.”25 The ECJ26, however, over‐
ruled both decisions by  referring  to  the  fact  that “Article 107(1) TFEU does not distinguish between 
the causes or the objectives of state aid, but defines them in relation to their effects”.27 






































Article  108  TFEU  against  Ireland,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands  in  the  cases  “Apple”,32  “Star‐












ing. This was already done  in  the past.36  It  is rather  that  it examines  individual  rulings  issued by  the 
national tax authorities on the basis of their national tax law instead of limiting the examination to tax 
rules. Until now  the Commission examined whether a  tax rule  that provided  for an exemption  from 































 the ruling has been  issued  in contradiction to the applicable tax provisions and has resulted  in a 
lower amount of tax. 
The consequences of examining individual tax rulings in addition to general tax rules are tremendous. 
Since, according  to Article 108(3) TFEU, Member States are not allowed  to put a measure  that con‐
tains state aid into effect until the Commission gives its final consent, all APAs (if they are in the end to 
be considered as state aid) have to be notified to the European Commission prior to their conclusion. 




Advanced pricing arrangements  (APAs) determine,  in advance of  intra‐group  transactions, an appro‐
priate set of criteria  for the determination of the transfer pricing  for those transactions over a  fixed 
period of time. Transfer pricing concerns the prices for commercial transactions between various parts 
of the same corporate group, e.g. prices set for goods sold or services provided by one subsidiary of a 
corporate group  to another  subsidiary of  that  same group. Those prices  increase  the profits of  the 
good‐selling/service‐providing subsidiary and decrease  the profits  for  the buying subsidiary. By  that, 
transfer pricing has a direct impact on the respective taxable base of both subsidiaries. 














































determining  the  division  of  profits  that  independent  enterprises would  have  expected  to  realise  from engaging  in  the 
transaction or transactions. 








a  prudent  hypothetical market  operator, who would  require  a market  conform  remuneration  of  a 
subsidiary or a branch, which reflect normal conditions of competition.  
b) Selectivity 






of  the proper application of  the  “arm’s  length principle”  since both  require  the establishment of a 
comparable market competitor. This can raise a lot of doubts with regard to the correct classification 
of the taxpayer for transfer pricing purposes, with regard to the selection of the correct comparable 






current  investigations and  the  subsequent  judicial disputes at  the General Court and  the European 
Court of Justice will certainly provide for some clarification. 























Commission notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct
business taxation
(98/C 384/03)
(Text with EEA relevance)
Introduction
1.ÙOn 1 December 1997, following a wideÜranging
discussion on the need for coordinated action at
Community level to tackle harmful tax competition,
the Council (Ecofin) adopted a series of conclusions
and agreed a resolution on a code of conduct for
business taxation (hereinafter "code of conduct’)ØØ(˛).
On that occasion, the Commission undertook to
draw up guidelines on the application of Articles 92
and 93 of the Treaty to measures relating to direct
business taxation and committed itself "to the strict
application of the aid rules concerned’. The code of
conduct aims to improve transparency in the tax area
through a system of information exchanges between
Member States and of assessment of any tax
measures that may be covered by it. For their part,
the State aid provisions of the Treaty will also
contribute through their own mechanism to the
objective of tackling harmful tax competition.
2.ÙThe Commission’s undertaking regarding State aid
in the form of tax measures forms part of the wider
objective of clarifying and reinforcing the application
of the State aid rules in order to reduce distortions
of competition in the single market. The principle of
incompatibility with the common market and the
derogations from that principle apply to aid "in any
form whatsoever’, including certain tax measures.
However, the question whether a tax measure can be
qualified as aid under Article 92(1) of the Treaty
calls for clarification which this notice proposes to
provide. Such clarification is particularly important
in view of the procedural requirements that stem
from designation as aid and of the consequences
where Member States fail to comply with such
requirements.
3.ÙFollowing the completion of the single market and
the liberalisation of capital movements, it has also
become apparent that there is a need to examine
the particular effects of aid granted in the
(˛)ÙOJ C 2, 6.1.1998, p. 1.
form of tax measures and to spell out the conseÜ
quences as regards assessment of the aid’s compatiÜ
bility with the common marketØ(ˇ). The establishment
of economic and monetary union and the consoliÜ
dation of national budgets which it entails will make
it even more essential to have strict control of State
aid in whatever form it may take. Similarly, account
must also be taken, in the common interest, of the
major repercussions which some aid granted through
tax systems may have on the revenue of other
Member States.
4.ÙIn addition to the objective of ensuring that
Commission decisions are transparent and
predictable, this notice also aims to ensure
consistency and equality of treatment between
Member States. The Commission intends, as the
code of conduct notes, to examine or reÜexamine
case by case, on the basis of this notice, the tax
arrangements in force in the Member States.
A. Community powers of action
5.ÙThe Treaty empowers the Community to take
measures to eliminate various types of distortion that
harm the proper functioning of the common market.
It is thus essential to distinguish between the
different types of distortion.
6.ÙSome general tax measures may impede the proper
functioning of the internal market. In the case of
such measures, the Treaty provides, on the one
hand, for the possibility of harmonising Member
States’ tax provisions on the basis of Article 100
(Council directives, adopted unanimously). On the
other, some disparities between planned or existing
general provisions in Member States may distort
competition and create distortions that need to be
eliminated on the basis of Articles 101 and 102
(consultation of the relevant Member States by
the Commission; if necessary, Council directives
adopted by a qualified majority).
(ˇ)ÙSee action plan for the single market, CSE(97) 1, 4 June
1997, strategic target 2, action 1.
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7.ÙThe distortions of competition deriving from State
aid fall under a system of prior Commission authorÜ
isation, subject to review by the Community judiÜ
cature. Pursuant to Article 93(3), State aid measures
must be notified to the Commission. Member States
may not put their proposed aid measures into effect
until the Commission has approved them. The
Commission examines the compatibility of aid not in
terms of the form which it may take, but in terms of
its effect. It may decide that the Member State must
amend or abolish aid which the Commission finds to
be incompatible with the common market. Where
aid has already been implemented in breach of the
procedural rules, the Member State must in principle
recover it from the recipient(s).
B. Application of Article 92(1) of the EC Treaty to tax
measures
8.ÙArticle 92(1) states that "any aid granted by a
Member State or through State resources in any
form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to
distort competition by favouring certain underÜ
takings or the production of certain goods shall, in
so far as it affects trade between Member States, be
incompatible with the common market’. In applying
the Community rules on State aid, it is irrelevant
whether the measure is a tax measure, since Article
92 applies to aid measures "in any form whatsoever’.
To be termed aid, within the meaning of Article 92,
a measure must meet the cumulative criteria
described below.
9.ÙFirstly, the measure must confer on recipients an
advantage which relieves them of charges that are
normally borne from their budgets. The advantage
may be provided through a reduction in the firm’s
tax burden in various ways, including:
-Ùa reduction in the tax base (such as special
deductions, special or accelerated depreciation
arrangements or the entering of reserves on the
balance sheet),
-Ùa total or partial reduction in the amount of tax
(such as exemption or a tax credit),
-Ùdeferment, cancellation or even special rescheÜ
duling of tax debt.
10.ÙSecondly, the advantage must be granted by the
State or through State resources. A loss of tax
revenue is equivalent to consumption of State
resources in the form of fiscal expenditure. This
criterion also applies to aid granted by regional or
local bodies in the Member StatesØ(—). Furthermore,
State support may be provided just as much through
tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or adminisÜ
trative nature as through the practices of the tax
authorities.
11.ÙThirdly, the measure must affect competition and
trade between Member States. This criterion
presupposes that the beneficiary of the measure
exercises an economic activity, regardless of the
beneficiary’s legal status or means of financing.
Under settled caseÜlaw, for the purposes of this
provision, the criterion of trade being affected is met
if the recipient firm carries on an economic activity
involving trade between Member States. The mere
fact that the aid strengthens the firm’s position
compared with that of other firms which are
competitors in intraÜCommunity trade is enough to
allow the conclusion to be drawn that intraÜ
Community trade is affected. Neither the fact that
aid is relatively small in amountØ(Ñ), nor the fact that
the recipient is moderate in size or its share of the
Community market very smallØ(Ò), nor indeed the
fact that the recipient does not carry out exportsØ(Ó)
or exports virtually all its production outside the
CommunityØ(Ô) do anything to alter this conclusion.
12.ÙLastly, the measure must be specific or selective in
that it favours "certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods’. The selective
advantage involved here may derive from an
exception to the tax provisions of a legislative, reguÜ
latory or administrative nature or from a discreÜ
tionary practice on the part of the tax authorities.
However, the selective nature of a measure may be
justified by "the nature or general scheme of the
system’Ø(Õ). If so, the measure is not considered to be
aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) of the
Treaty. These various aspects are looked at below.
(—)ÙJudgment of the Court of Justice in Case 248/84 Germany
v. Commission [1987 ECR 4013.
(Ñ)ÙWith the exception, however, of aid meeting the tests of the
de minimis rule. See the Commission notice published in
OJ C 68, 6.3.1996, p. 9.
(Ò)ÙJoined Cases CÜ278/92, CÜ279/92 and CÜ280/92 Spain
v. Commission [1994 ECR IÜ4103.
(Ó)ÙCase 102/87 France v. Commission [1998 ECR 4067.
(Ô)ÙCase CÜ142/87 Belgium v. Commission [1990 ECR IÜ959.
(Õ)ÙCase 173/73 Italy v. Commission [1974 ECR 709.
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Distinction between State aid and general measures
13.ÙTax measures which are open to all economic agents
operating within a Member State are in principle
general measures. They must be effectively open to
all firms on an equal access basis, and they may not
de facto be reduced in scope through, for example,
the discretionary power of the State to grant them or
through other factors that restrict their practical
effect. However, this condition does not restrict the
power of Member States to decide on the economic
policy which they consider most appropriate and, in
particular, to spread the tax burden as they see fit
across the different factors of production. Provided
that they apply without distinction to all firms and to
the production of all goods, the following measures
do not constitute State aid:
-Ùtax measures of a purely technical nature (for
example, setting the rate of taxation,
depreciation rules and rules on loss carryÜovers;
provisions to prevent double taxation or tax
avoidance),
-Ùmeasures pursuing general economic policy
objectives through a reduction of the tax burden
related to certain production costs (research and
development (R&D), the environment, training,
employment).
14.ÙThe fact that some firms or some sectors benefit
more than others from some of these tax measures
does not necessarily mean that they are caught by
the competition rules governing State aid. Thus,
measures designed to reduce the taxation of labour
for all firms have a relatively greater effect on
labourÜintensive industries than on capitalÜintensive
industries, without necessarily constituting State aid.
Similarly, tax incentives for environmental, R&D or
training investment favour only the firms which
undertake such investment, but again do not necesÜ
sarily constitute State aid.
15.ÙIn a judgment delivered in 1974Ø(Ö), the Court of
Justice held that any measure intended partially or
wholly to exempt firms in a particular sector from
the charges arising from the normal application of
the general system "without there being any justifiÜ
(Ö)ÙSee footnote 8.
cation for this exemption on the basis of the nature
or general scheme of this system’ constituted State
aid. The judgment also states that "Article 92 does
not distinguish between the measures of State interÜ
vention concerned by reference to their causes or
aims but defines them in relation to their effects’.
The judgment also points out that the fact that the
measure brings charges in the relevant sector more
into line with those of its competitors in other
Member States does not alter the fact that it is aid.
Such divergences between tax systems, which, as
pointed out above, are covered by Articles 100 to
102, cannot be corrected by unilateral measures that
target the firms which are most affected by the
disparities between tax systems.
16.ÙThe main criterion in applying Article 92(1) to a tax
measure is therefore that the measure provides in
favour of certain undertakings in the Member State
an exception to the application of the tax system.
The common system applicable should thus first be
determined. It must then be examined whether the
exception to the system or differentiations within
that system are justified "by the nature or general
scheme’ of the tax system, that is to say, whether
they derive directly from the basic or guiding prinÜ
ciples of the tax system in the Member State
concerned. If this is not the case, then State aid is
involved.
The selectivity or specificity criterion
17.ÙThe Commission’s decisionÜmaking practice so far
shows that only measures whose scope extends to
the entire territory of the State escape the specificity
criterion laid down in Article 92(1). Measures which
are regional or local in scope may favour certain
undertakings, subject to the principles outlined in
paragraph 16. The Treaty itself qualifies as aid
measures which are intended to promote the
economic development of a region. Article 92(3)(a)
and (c) explicitly provides, in the case of this type of
aid, for possible derogations from the general
principle of incompatibility laid down in Article
92(1).
18.ÙThe Treaty clearly provides that a measure which is
sectorally specific is caught by Article 92(1). Article
92(1) expressly includes the phrase "the production
of certain goods’ among the criteria determining
whether there is aid that is subject to Commission
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monitoring. According to wellÜestablished practice
and caseÜlaw, a tax measure whose main effect is to
promote one or more sectors of activity constitutes
aid. The same applies to a measure that favours
only national products which are exportedØ(˛˝).
Furthermore, the Commission has taken the view
that a measure which targets all of the sectors that
are subject to international competition constitutes
aidØ(˛˛). A derogation from the base rate of
corporation tax for an entire section of the economy
therefore constitutes, except for certain casesØ(˛ˇ),
State aid, as the Commission decided for a measure
concerning the whole of the manufacturing
sectorØ(˛—).
19.ÙIn several Member States, different tax rules apply
depending on the status of the undertakings. Some
public undertakings, for example, are exempt from
local taxes or from company taxes. Such rules, which
accord preferential treatment to undertakings having
the legal status of public undertaking and carrying
out an economic activity, may constitute State aid
within the meaning of Article 92 of the Treaty.
20.ÙSome tax benefits are on occasion restricted to
certain types of undertaking, to some of their
functions (intraÜgroup services, intermediation or
coordination) or to the production of certain goods.
In so far as they favour certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods, they may constitute
State aid as referred to in Article 92(1).
Discretionary administrative practices
21.ÙThe discretionary practices of some tax authorities
may also give rise to measures that are caught by
Article 92. The Court of Justice acknowledges that
treating economic agents on a discretionary basis
may mean that the individual application of a
general measure takes on the features of a selective
measure, in particular where exercise of the
(˛˝)ÙJoined Cases 6 and 11/69 Commission v. France [1969
ECR 561.
(˛˛)ÙCommission Decision 97/239/EC of 4 December 1996 in
the "Maribel bis/ter’ case (OJ L 95, 10.4.1997, p. 25)
(currently sub judice, Case CÜ75/97).
(˛ˇ)ÙIn particular, agriculture and fisheries, see paragraph 27.
(˛—)ÙCommission decision of 22 July 1998 in the "Irish
corporation tax’ case (SG(98) D/7209) not yet published.
discretionary power goes beyond the simple
management of tax revenue by reference to objective
criteriaØ(˛Ñ).
22.ÙIf in daily practice tax rules need to be interpreted,
they cannot leave room for a discretionary treatment
of undertakings. Every decision of the administration
that departs from the general tax rules to the benefit
of individual undertakings in principle leads to a
presumption of State aid and must be analysed in
detail. As far as administrative rulings merely contain
an interpretation of general rules, they do not give
rise to a presumption of aid. However, the opacity
of the decisions taken by the authorities and the
room for manoeuvre which they sometimes enjoy
support the presumption that such is at any rate their
effect in some instances. This does not make
Member States any less able to provide their
taxpayers with legal certainty and predictability on
the application of general tax rules.
Justification of a derogation by "the nature or general
scheme of the system’
23.ÙThe differential nature of some measures does not
necessarily mean that they must be considered to be
State aid. This is the case with measures whose
economic rationale makes them necessary to the
functioning and effectiveness of the tax systemØ(˛Ò).
However, it is up to the Member State to provide
such justification.
24.ÙThe progressive nature of an income tax scale or
profit tax scale is justified by the redistributive
purpose of the tax. Calculation of asset depreciation
and stock valuation methods vary from one Member
State to another, but such methods may be inherent
in the tax systems to which they belong. In the same
way, the arrangements for the collection of fiscal
debts can differ from one Member State to the
other. Lastly, some conditions may be justified by
objective differences between taxpayers. However,
if the tax authority has discretionary freedom
(˛Ñ)ÙCase CÜ241/94 France v. Commission (Kimberly Clark
Sopalin) [1996 ECR IÜ4551.
(˛Ò)ÙCommission decision 96/369/EC of 13 March 1996
concerning fiscal aid given to German airlines in the form
of a depreciation facility (OJ L 146, 20.6.1996, p. 42).
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to set different depreciation periods or different
valuation methods, firm by firm, sector by sector,
there is a presumption of aid. Such a presumption
also exists when the fiscal administration handles
fiscal debts on a case by case basis with an objective
different from the objective of optimising the
recovery of tax debts from the enterprise concerned.
25.ÙObviously, profit tax cannot be levied if no profit is
earned. It may thus be justified by the nature of the
tax system that nonÜprofitÜmaking undertakings,
such as foundations or associations, are specifically
exempt from the taxes on profits if they cannot
actually earn any profits. Furthermore, it may also
be justified by the nature of the tax system that
cooperatives which distribute all their profits to their
members are not taxed at the level of the cooperative
when tax is levied at the level of their members.
26.ÙA distinction must be made between, on the one
hand, the external objectives assigned to a particular
tax scheme (in particular, social or regional
objectives) and, on the other, the objectives which
are inherent in the tax system itself. The whole
purpose of the tax system is to collect revenue to
finance State expenditure. Each firm is supposed to
pay tax once only. It is therefore inherent in the
logic of the tax system that taxes paid in the State in
which the firm is resident for tax purposes should be
taken into account. Certain exceptions to the tax
rules are, however, difficult to justify by the logic of
a tax system. This is, for example, the case if
nonÜresident companies are treated more favourably
than resident ones or if tax benefits are granted to
head offices or to firms providing certain services
(for example, financial services) within a group.
27.ÙSpecific provisions that do not contain discretionary
elements, allowing for example tax to be determined
on a fixed basis (for example, in the agriculture or
fisheries sectors), may be justified by the nature and
general scheme of the system where, for example,
they take account of specific accounting reÜ
quirements or of the importance of land in assets
which are specific to certain sectors; such provisions
do not therefore constitute State aid. Lastly, the
logic underlying certain specific provisions on the
taxation of small and mediumÜsized enterprises
(including small agricultural enterprisesØ(˛Ó)) is
comparable to that underlying the progressiveness of
a tax scale.
(˛Ó)ÙOperators in the agricultural sector with no more than 10
annual work units.
C. Compatibility with the common market of State aid in
the form of tax measures
28.ÙIf a tax measure constitutes aid that is caught by
Article 92(1), it can nevertheless, like aid granted in
other forms, qualify for one of the derogations from
the principle of incompatibility with the common
market provided for in Article 92(2) and (3).
Furthermore, where the recipient, whether a private
or public undertaking, has been entrusted by the
State with the operation of services of general
economic interest, the aid may also qualify for
application of the provisions of Article 90 of the
TreatyØ(˛Ô).
29.ÙThe Commission could not, however, authorise aid
which proved to be in breach both of the rules laid
down in the Treaty, particularly those relating to the
ban on discrimination and to the right of estabÜ
lishment, and of the provisions of secondary law on
taxationØ(˛Õ). Such aspects may, in parallel, be the
object of a separate procedure on the basis of Article
169. As is clear from caseÜlaw, those aspects of aid
which are indissolubly linked to the object of the aid
and which contravene specific provisions of the
Treaty other than Articles 92 and 93 must however
be examined in the light of the procedure under
Article 93 as part of an overall examination of the
compatibility or the incompatibility of the aid.
30.ÙThe qualification of a tax measure as harmful under
the code of conduct does not affect its possible
qualification as a State aid. However the assessment
of the compatibility of fiscal aid with the common
market will have to be made, taking into account,
inter alia, the effects of aid that are brought to light
in the application of the code of conduct.
31.ÙWhere a fiscal aid is granted in order to provide an
incentive for firms to embark on certain specific
projects (investment in particular) and where its
intensity is limited with respect to the costs of
carrying out the project, it is no different from a
subsidy and may be accorded the same treatment.
Nevertheless, such arrangements must lay down
sufficiently transparent rules to enable the benefit
conferred to be quantified.
(˛Ô)ÙJudgment of the Court of First Instance in Case TÜ106/95
FFSA and others v. Commission [1997 ECR IIÜ229. Order
of the Court of Justice in Case CÜ174/97 P [1998 IÜ1303.
(˛Õ)ÙCase 74/76 Iannelli v. Meroni [1977 ECR 557. See also
Cases 73/79 "Sovraprezzo’ [1980 ECR 1533, TÜ49/93
"SIDE’ [1995 ECR IIÜ2501 and Joined Cases C 142 and
143/80 "Salengo’ [1981 ECR 1413.
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32.ÙIn most cases, however, tax relief provisions are
general in nature: they are not linked to the
carryingÜout of specific projects and reduce a firm’s
current expenditure without it being possible to
assess the precise volume involved when the
Commission carries out its ex ante examination. Such
measures constitute "operating aid’. Operating aid is
in principle prohibited. The Commission authorises it
at present only in exceptional cases and subject to
certain conditions, for example in shipbuilding,
certain types of environmental protection aidØ(˛Ö) and
in regions, including ultraÜperipheral regions,
covered by the Article 92(3)(a) aid derogation
provided that they are duly justified and their level is
proportional to the handicaps they are intended to
offsetØ(ˇ˝). It must in principle (with the exception of
the two categories of aid mentioned below) be
degressive and limited in time. At present, operating
aid can also be authorised in the form of transport
aid in ultraÜperipheral regions and in certain Nordic
regions that are sparsely populated and are seriously
handicapped in terms of accessibility. Operating aid
may not be authorised where it represents aid for
exports between Member States. As for State aid in
favour of the maritime transport sector the specific
rules for that sector applyØ(ˇ˛).
33.ÙIf it is to be considered by the Commission to be
compatible with the common market, State aid
intended to promote the economic development of
particular areas must be "in proportion to, and
targeted at, the aims sought’. For the examination of
regional aid the criteria allow account to be taken of
other possible effects, in particular of certain effects
brought to light by the code of conduct. Where a
derogation is granted on the basis of regional
criteria, the Commission must ensure in particular
that the relevant measures:
-Ùcontribute to regional development and relate to
activities having a local impact. The estabÜ
lishment of offÜshore activities does not, to the
extent that their externalities on the local
economy are low, normally provide satisfactory
support for the local economy,
-Ùrelate to real regional handicaps. It is open to
question whether there are any real regional
handicaps for activities for which the additional
(˛Ö)ÙCommunity guidelines on State aid for environmental
protection (OJ C 72, 10.3.1994, p. 3).
(ˇ˝)ÙGuidelines on national regional aid (OJ C 74, 10.3.1998,
p. 9).
(ˇ˛)ÙCommunity guidelines on State aid to maritime transport
(OJ C 205, 5.7.1997, p. 5).
costs have little incidence, such as for example
the transport costs for financing activities, which
lend themselves to tax avoidance,
-Ùare examined in a Community contextØ(ˇˇ). The
Commission must in this respect take account of
any negative effects which such measures may
have on other Member States.
D. Procedures
34.ÙArticle 93(3) requires Member States to notify the
Commission of all their "plans to grant or alter aid’
and provides that any proposed measures may not be
put into effect without the Commission’s prior
approval. This procedure applies to all aid, including
tax aid.
35.ÙIf the Commission finds that State aid which has
been put into effect in breach of this rule does not
qualify for any of the exemptions provided for in the
Treaty and is therefore incompatible with the
common market, it requires the Member State to
recover it, except where that would be contrary to a
general principle of Community law, in particular
legitimate expectations to which the Commission’s
behaviour can give rise. In the case of State aid in
the form of tax measures, the amount to be covered
is calculated on the basis of a comparison between
the tax actually paid and the amount which should
have been paid if the generally applicable rule had
been applied. Interest is added to this basic amount.
The interest rate to be applied is equivalent to the
reference rate used to calculate the grant equivalent
of regional aid.
36.ÙArticle 93(1) states that the Commission "shall in
cooperation with Member States, keep under
constant review all systems of aid existing in those
States’. Such review extends to State aid in the form
of tax measures. So as to allow such review to be
carried out, the Member States are required to
submit to the Commission every year reports on
their existing State aid systems. In the case of tax
relief or full or partial tax exemption, the reports
must provide an estimate of budgetary revenue lost.
Following its review, the Commission may, if it
(ˇˇ)ÙCase 730/79 Philip Morris v. Commission [1980 ECR
2671.
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considers that the scheme is not or is no longer
compatible with the common market, propose that
the Member State amend or abolish it.
E. Implementation
37.ÙThe Commission will, on the basis of the guidelines
set out in this notice and as from the time of its
publication, examine the plans for tax aid notified to
it and tax aid illegally implemented in the Member
States and will review existing systems. This notice is
published for guidance purposes and is not
exhaustive. The Commission will take account of all
the specific circumstances in each individual case.
38.ÙThe Commission will review the application of this
notice two years after its publication.
NonÜopposition to a notified concentration
(Case No IV/M.1202 - Renault/Iveco)
(98/C 384/04)
(Text with EEA relevance)
On 22 October 1998, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration
and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b)
of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89. The full text of the decision is only available in
French and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will
be available:
-Ùas a paper version through the sales offices of the Office for Official Publications of the
European Communities (see list on the last page),
-Ùin electronic form in the "CFR’ version of the CELEX database, under document
number 398M1202. CELEX is the computerised documentation system of European
Community law; for more information concerning subscriptions please contact:
EURÜOP,
Information, Marketing and Public Relations (OP/4B),
2, rue Mercier,
LÜ2985 Luxembourg.
Tel. (352) 29Ø29Ü42455, fax (352) 29Ø29Ü42763.
Withdrawal of notification of a concentration
(Case No IV/M.1246 - LHZ/Carl Zeiss)
(98/C 384/05)
(Text with EEA relevance)
On 24 September 1998, the European Commission received notification of a proposed concenÜ
tration between LH Systems and Carl Zeiss Stiftung. On 1 December 1998, the notifying
parties informed the Commission that they withdrew their notification.
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